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Today, plants in chemical and process industry are becoming larger and more complex
Coro llary of this trend implies that each hour of down time is more expens ive. As
industrial sys tems enlarge, the total amount of energy and material being handled
increases, making fault diagnosis and safety management considerably important both
from the viewpoi nt of process safety as well as economic loss. Therefore, seeking an
effec tive approach to perform fault diagnos is and implement safety management is
important and imperat ive. An innovative methodology of risk-based SPC fault diagnosis
and its integration with Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is proposed in this thesis to
Unlike any existing fault diagnosis and safety management approac hes. the proposed
methodologypioneers abrandnewpathway forlhe fauhdiagnosis and safety
management in process industry. This proposed methodology neither depends on any
process model as model-based methods, nor depends on large amount of histor ical
process data as conventiona l process history based method. Control chart technique is
used to distinguish abnormal situation from normal operation bascd on three-sig ma rule
and linear trend forecast. Time series and moving average teehniques are used to perform
real time monitoring and noise filtering in fault diagnosis process . Furthermore, risk
indicators areu sedt oid entify andd etemline potential fault(s)t om inimize thc number of
The proposed methodology of risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and itsintegrationwith
safety instrumented systems is implemented using 02 development cnvironmcmTo tcst
and verify this methodology, a tank filling system and a steam power plant system with
SISl s and SlS2s are developed in 02 environment. A technique breakthrough, from
univariate monitoring to multivariate monitoring for SPC fauitdi agnosish asb ccnm adc
in the verification in the steam power plant system
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Cha ptcr l lnt rod uction
In 1987. Robcrt M . Solo\\'.3n cconomjstatthc Massachu~us l nstitutcofTechnology.
received the Nobel Prize in economics for his work in determining the sources of
economic growth. Professor Solow concluded that the bulk of an economy's growth is the
rcsult of lcchnological advanccs (Crowl and Louvar. 2002).lt isrcasonablc 10 conclu de
that the growth of an indus try is also dependent on tcchnologicaJ advances .Thisis
especially true in the chem ical industry, which is entering an era of more complex
proccsscs:highcrpressurc,morcrcaclivcchcmicals,andclI:oticchcmisuy . Mon:comp lcx
proccsscs rcqu ircmorc complcx sa fcty ll~hnology.Many industrial i stsevcn believc thal
the develo pment and application of safety technology is actually a constraint on the
growth of the chcrnical industry,
As chemica l process technology becomes more co mplex. chemical engineers will need a
more detailed and fundamental understanding ofsafety. llowa rd II . Fawcett said. "To
know is tu survive and to ignore fundamentals is 10 court disaster." (Fawcett and Wood.
1982). Flixborough disastcr, which happened in England in 1974, was the wake-up call
for the UK. The incident resulted in 28 deaths, over 100 injuries and the complete
destruct ion of the plant. The dea th toll from the Bhopal accident, which happcncd in India
in 1984, was over 2,000 at the time of the accident. Some recent reports place the
estimates as high as 10.000 with over 200,000 inj uries. Chemo byl accident. which
happcncdinSovi ctU nioni n 1986. is cstimably one a ft he worst industrial aceidcnts a f all
timc. Pasadenaex plosian. whiehhappcnedinTeusinI989.waslhcwakc-upeallforlhe
US ....ilh23 fatalities and 130inj urics. Anothe r accident in nearby Chan nelview killed 17
and injured over 100 less than one year later; These twa accidents resulted in the
Occu pational Safety and lIea lth Admini stration (OS HA) PSM (Process Safety
Managemcnt) JcgisJation (Gruhn. P, J999).
As process safe ly incidents arc still happening today and as such incidents sometimes
leadtoseriousconsequcnccsforpcoplc, thccnvironmcntand propcrty ,itisconcludcd
that the process industry has a rcsponsibiluy to further reduce occurrcnccofthcse
incidcnts . Duclothco bscrvcdchangingsitu3tioninthcproccssindustry,charactcrilcdby
achanging kindofincidcnlsccnariosandc3u5Cs.anccdexislsforachanging kind of
control ever process safcty( Kncgtcring and Pasman, 2009).
In an increasing ly multidisciplinary engineering enviro nment. and in the face of ever
incrcasingsystcmcomplcxity, thcrcisagrowingdcmandforcnginccrsandlcchnicians
involved in process engineering to be aware: of the implications of designing and
operating safety-related systems. Safety Instrumented Systems play 3 vital role in
providing the protective layer functionality in many industrial process and automation
1.1 SafetyI nstrumente d Sys tem
The International Electro-technical Commission (lEe) 61508 (2000) standard defin es
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) as "a system composed of sensors, logic solvers and
final-col1trolciclllcntsfor thcpurposc or tuking theprocess to a safe state, when
predeterminl:o conditions are violatco". SISs arc also called cmcrgcncy shuldown (ESD)
systcrns,sa fetys hutdown(S SD}sys tcms,a ndsa fcty interlot'ksys terns
Safety instrumented systems lS IS) arc used in the oil and gas industry to detect the onset
of hazardous events andlorto mitigate their consequences to humans , material assets , and
thc cnvironmcnt (Lundteigcn and Rausand, 2007). A SIS generally consist sofoncor
more input clements (e.g., sensors , transmitters) , one or more logic solvers {e.g.,
programmable logic controllers (PLe], relay logic systems), and one or more final
elemcnts(e.g.,safetyvalves,circuitbreakers},asshowninFig.J .
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Safety can be defined as "freedom from unaccep table risk". This definiticn is Imponam ,
because it highlights the fact that all industrial processes involve risk. Absol ute safe ty,
where risk is complete ly eliminated, can never be achieved: risk canonIy bc reduced to
an accep table level. Therefore all risks should be dea lt with on the ALARPbasis,i .c.thc
target is to ensure that risk is reduced to As l ow As Rcasonably Practica blc. The ALARP
principle provides a general objccrivc of SjS, which is to reduce thc frcquency at which a
hazard may occur to an acceptable or at least a tolerable level.
Process risk is defi ned by the frcquency of the occurrence and the potential consequence
severity of the process hazard (Summers , 2007). The formula for risk is:
To de fine the frequency. the initiating events arc identified for each process hazard . and
their frequency of occurren ce is estimated. The consequence severity is the logical
conclusion lo thepropagalionof lhe proccssha7.urd if no protection layers 'lre
implemented as barriers to the event .
Safety Mcthods employcd 10 protec t against or mitigate harm/damag e to pcrsonnclcplant
andthccnvironmcn t.an drcduccriskincludc·
• Changingthcproccssorenginccringdcsign
• Incrcasing mcchanical intcgrity of thc systcm
• Dc\'cloping detailcd training and opcrationalp roccdurcs
• Incrcasingt hc frcquency of tcsting of critica l system componcnts
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unsafcslalc loasafestatc(Marszalc lc.,2003).AsafetyfunClionworksasaprotC'Ction
againslaspccificandidcotificdhazardousc\'cnt.hisamcthod lo dcfinethcfunctional
relationship between inputs and outputs in SIS. Inputs can be regarded as scnsors.ourputs
can be regarded as final control clements and safety functioncanbc regardcd as a logic
SF is able to assist SIS 10reduce the risks. The amount of risk reduction can be measured
based on thecalculatcd Probability of Failures on Demand (PFD), which isthc
probability that SF fails to maintain safc state when predetermined safery conditions arc
violalcd.Safctyfuncliononlyrcduccsriskandwillnc\'crcomplclelyeliminatc the risk.
However, it would besufficient to reduce thc risk to an acceptable level.
1.2 Safety Ana lysis
Unlike the conv en ient un its like volt or kilogram , ther e is no univer sa l unit for risk
Scales for one industry may not suit those in another. Fortunat ely. the method of
ca1culation isgcncrally consislcnt and it ispossiblctoarrivcatareasonable scale of
values fora given industry. As a result, lEe have sugges ted using a system of risk
classification that is adaptabl e for most safety situations. Referring 10 Annex B of IEC
61508 part 5, the risk classificat ion table is provided as shown in Table l .
Freq uent)' Co nseq uences
Catastrophic Crit ical Marginal Negligible
Frequent I I I II
Probab le I I II III
Occasional I II III III
Remote II III III IV
Imp robable III II I IV IV
Incredible IV IV IV IV
The risk classificat ion mentioned in Table 1 is a genera lized version that works like
follow ing:
• Determine (he frequency clement of the EUe risk without the addi tion of any
prote ctive featu res (Fnp) ;
If. through using Table Lthis leads ro risk Class Lthen funherriskreduction Is requtred .
Risk class IVor llJ would bc jolcrablc risks . Risk class II wouldrcquire funher
In practice, this Table I is a generic table for adaptation by differem industry scctors . Tt is
intended that any given industry sector should insert appropriate numbers into the lid ds
ofthclablcandhenceeslablishacccptablcnorms.Fornamptc,inTablc 2.somclrial
Frequ ency Catastrophic Critica l .'lal"J:inal ~egli J:i blr
> I dcath Idcathor Miner injury Prod loss
mj un cs
l pcr ycar I I I II
1per 5 years I I II III
1per 50 years I II III III
I per 500 years II III III IV
I per 5000 years III III IV IV
I per 50000years IV IV IV IV
1.2.2 Ri'k Redu ction Term ' and Equation,
Thctennsandequationsthalcanbcuscdtodelincthcriskrcduetionareasfollo\lo
Ft v Tolcrable Risk Frequency
Fnp = Unprotected Risk Frequency
Fp = Protected Risk Frequency
RRF :o:: RiskRcductionFactor
PFDavg. = Probability of Failureon Demand
RRF ~ Fnp / Ft (I -I)
rFD3vg. - IIRRF ~Ft / Fnp (1-2)
1.2.3 Safely lnt egrity Level (SIL)
SILrcprcscnts the amount of risk reduction that is required from a safety function.IEe
61508 defines SILas"adiscrttclc"cl(oncoffour) for spccifyiog thc safcry integrity
rcqcircrncms ofsafcry function:' (2000). Safety integrity level 4 (Sll4) is the highest
level and safety integrity level I (Stl.Ij is ihe Iowcstonc.
SIL has become increasingly pan of' the design and operation of safety instrumented
system (Kirkwood and Tibbs. 2005), Companies arc now specifying SILha scd on Inc
amount of risk reduction that is required to achieve a rolcrnblc risk level. The SIS is
designed to meet or exceed this level of perfonnancc.
How do we decide when 10 usc a safety instru mented system and how good must it be?
The answer is: it depends on the amount of risk reduction required after the 0 thcr dcviccs
havctx-cntakcnintoaccount.ThcmcasufCofthcamoumofriskrcductionprovidcdbya
safctysyslcmiscallcdthcSafctylnlcgrity.andilisiJIuslralcdbyFig.5from lEC.
~::: ::- ...,8~- LJCJC)--- ---
T1loo ...._...,.--"'.~•• ,, _ .
1I~ .. Ilo<..rCf)'_~_.• _._<Jf'"
InPnln"lOlul<lhc:pcrl"""""'. ...Il1'! ..... "'I' ....tI ."'SIL..... II>OI!,"Th<SIL. ...
.l<r"«lfn....,hcrcon,,,,,,,,,,r,,oJ,nl,,,<l,,.,,r,<",,, .. nf •• r<ly.y",,,,,,,Th<pr,",,,pl•
.. <Ih.... _'nF'I.6 "'borelhc:"""' ol ""'-'""' l""'odoIl"" ..,SIS,,_lLfitd .
n... i Il.RF~ ..__ ... .PI'O".md .
SIl .-
"'W"y 'Om«l '''''jI<01 PfDa' 1
to' ''''' n«d<drn .......... SIL "
--B-BB-- ._ .."weR," ~ srs ,.
RIlF ..... '"
Do,
PflJ- w
Do
''''. ...........''100 .''''
F....,." ,. Uy rh<SIl. ...1<"",,·,<I<> • • I... <>f.. f<tyIn
... IO<1I . Ilrn« . Ihc:rn1"""",,,, < I<v<lnf ..f<ty,",""""'"
d,, -t<l<d,nrn••mall""mba'of"'<J<KIanrgrad<o
TIl< I ~:e .tond<rd pro,-ide>,h< fol lo",nKto~"' IOfSIL.
"'~I, J : . l<finl' ln.. nf Sl I.. fo, d, m. n:I ", od, nf np<"
su R... S·nfA'·...SodPf D R... S'o
10" "," pm ~lo ' 100,000
, 1 0 ~ <. PFD ~ 10" 10.000
, to '> ~- PFD ~ 10" ,~-
, 10" <- PFD ~ 104 '00 _
AnSILI.,........i>_ .. "'lioble,nprovod,nS"... f<d··""" ··SIL2, ... SILJ" ... C1I
m<>f,,,,hol>",.~ ... """"rh<SIL.,,."·,lIk,.,...,,lwquoJ,'Y.,,,,"pi" ,,'Yond""".,..,
B""' 11D"""'od<r
Anc\'cnllreeisagraphicallogicmodellhatidcnliticsandquanliticspossibleoulcomcs
following 3f1 initiating event [Gbodrau etc ., 2007) . Event trees begin with an initiating
event and work toward a final result Thi approach is inductive . Themcthod provides
information on bow a failure can occur and thc probability of occurrence . When an
accidcn toccursina plant. \'arioussafcl)'sytCTJ1comcintoplaytoprevCDtthcaccidcnl
from propagating . Thescsafcty) tC'1T1scilherfailo rsuccecd.lbe eventlreeapproach
includes the effects ofan event initiation followedby thc impact of the safety system
The typica l steps in an CVC'n l tree analysis arc:
I. ldcntify an initiat ing event of intcrest.
2. Identify the safety functions designed to deal with the initiating event,
3. Construct the event tree, and
4. Describe the rcsulting accidcnt cvcnl scqucnces.
l fn ppropriatc data arc available, the procedure is used 10 assign numcricnl vnlucs to thc
various events. This is used effectively to determine the probability of a certain seqlienee
of cvcnts and to decide what improvements arc required . An example of event tree
analysis is shown in Fig. 7.
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S13tit ic isamathcmaticalsc icnCC'pcrL1iningt o thec ollcction,analysis.inteTprt'tat ion or
explanat ion. and presentation of da13( MoscsC' tc.• 19 6) . Statistical PnxessControl is
defincdasasy tern that uSC'S statist ics to identify special causes cf varia tion in a proces
(Lro nard, I996). StatiSlicaI Proccss Control( SPC) ",as pionccn:d by \\' alter A. hcwhart
in the early I920s. W. Edwards Dcming lalcrapplicdSPC methods in the United States
during World War II . thereby succ sfully improv ing quality in the manufa cture of
munitions and other strategically important products. Deming was also instrumental in
introducing SPC methods to Japanese industry after the war had ended . In 1989, the
Software Enginee ring Institute introduced the notion that Sl'C can be usefully applicd to
non-manu facturing processes. such as software engi neering processes . Through surveys
and researches, I deeply believe that SPC method can be applied in thc proccss industry,
that is, 10 be utilized in my dcvclopmcnt forth c fault diagnosis and rcal timc moni toring
of the precess system.
Statistical Proccss Control (SPC) is :ll1cfTcctive mclhod of monitoring a process through
the use of control charts. Control charts cnablc uhc usc of objccti ve critcria for
distinguishing background variation from events of significance based on statistical
techniques. Much of its powe r Iies in the ability to monitor both process center and iIs
variation or devia tion about that center. By collecting data over time at V3riOUS points
within the process . variation s or deviat ions in the process can be detected and clearly
displa)'t'd. lfthede\'iationC'xcecdsth~holdspredefincd,thenafaultprobablyocc:urs.ln
this research. SPC"ill be used as a rauhdiagnosi method topcrfonn fault diagnosi
function to the process systems
A control chart isa statistical tool used to distinguish between variation in a process
resulting from common C3USCS and variation resulting from special causes. llprescntsa
graphiedis playo f proccss stability or instability over time.
E\'cry proeesshasvariation.SomcYariation maybc thcresuhofeauses which arc not
normally present in the process. This could be special cause variation. Some variationis
simply the result of numerous, ever-present differences in the process. This is common
cause variation. Control Charts differentiate between thcse two rypcs of variation.
In gcncraf. conuot chan contains a ccmcr Iinc that represents the mean value for the
in-comrol process. TwoOlherhorizontallines.callcdlhcuppcrconuollimit (UCL) and
the lower control limit (LCL),arcalso shown in Fig. 8. These control Iimits arc chosen so
that almost all of the data points .....ill fall within these limits as long as the process
rcmainsi n-eontrol. lf a singlequ ality charactcristich asb ecnm casured or computed from
a sample, the control chart shows the value of the quality charactcristic versus the sample
ll"Oe-=- =-_-=- - -- -- - -UCl-IO,860
10.0 Centerhne-10.05E
- - - - - - - - - - - - lCl-9.256
3 6 9 12 15
Samp le
The purpose in adding warning limits or subdividing the control chan into zones is to
provide early notification if something is amiss. Instead ofimmediatcly launching a
proccssi mprO\·ementetTontodetennine whcthcrspccialcauscsare prcscnt.thequality
cnginccr may temporarilyinc reasethcratcatwhichsamplcsa rc takenfro mthc process
output until it's clear that tbc prcccss is truly in control.
Oncgoalof usingaControlChanistoachieveandmaintainprocessstability. Process
stability is defined as a state in which a process has displayed a certain degree of
consistency in thc past and is expected to continue to do so in the futurc.Tbis consistency
is characterized by a stream of data falling wuhin control limits based on plus or minus 3
standard deviations (3 sigma) of lhecCnlcctine( \\'hcclerandChambcrs.199 2)
In statistics, signal processing and financial mathematics, a limc series is a sequence of
data points, measured typically at successive limes spaced at unifonn time intervals
Examples of time series arc the daily closing value of the Dow lo nes index or the annual
now volume of the Nile River at Aswan. Time series analysis comprises methods for
analyzing time series data in order 10 extract meaningful statistics and other
characteristics of the data. Time series forecasting is the usc ofa modcl to forecast future
events based on known past events: to predict data points bcforc thcy are measured.An
example of time series forccastingincconometricsisprcdictingtheopeningpriceofa
stock bascdon its past performance.
An example oftimc series for random data plus trend. with best-fit line and diffcrent
smoothing is shown in Fig. 9.
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Expandingout EMAynlmiayC3Ch lime results in the fcllowin g power scriesvshowing how
lhcwcightingfacloroncachdalapointpl .p2.ctc.dccrca secxponcnt ially:
E.lIA =a .(p,+(I-a)p, + (1- a )' p, + (1- a )' p, +...)
SMAtcchniquc is intuitive and simple . CMAtc chniquc is not 3S intuitive and simplc as
SMA, but it is more efficient in detecting small shifts. EWMAtcchniquc isu scd for
dctccting small sbifts.TikeIl.Srr 102(1 in the process mean.
I..lObjecti.-esof tbis Research
As process industrial systems become larger and more complex, the total amount of
energy and material being handled increases. making fault diagnosis and safety
management consid erably important both from the viewpoint of process safcry as well as
cconomic loss. Thc rc exislvarious kindsof mcthods lodolhcfault diagnosis and safety
management to the industrial processes . However, due to the limitations in various
mcthods ,thc cffcclS for fault diagnosis and safety management arc nor that desirable . For
this rcason, Vcnkatasubramanian C1C, (:!OO3)even proposed to develop hybrid systerns to
O\'CrCOffiC the limitations ofindi\idual solution strategies.
Motivated by the desireofsccking an effective approach topcrform faultdiagnosis and
implemen t safety manage ment in process sys tems, and by the CUTTCnlsiruation for solving
thisproblcm in academia, an innovativc mcthodology of risk-bascdSPC fault diagnosis
and its integration with Safety Instrumented System isproposcd in this thcsis. To verify
this mcthodolob'Y,G2dcvclopmcnt sofiwarc from Gcnsym Corpora lion i5 utilized in this
• To propose an innova tive methodo logy of risk-base d SPC fault diagnosi s and its
integration with SIS to solve the fauhdiagnosis and safety managem cnt prc blcm
in process engineering
• Using G2 develop ment environment. to implement and verify the proposed
methodology in a tank filling system developed with G2 softwarc .
• Realizing a technique breakthrough, from univariate control to multivariate
• Simulating a real process system, the steam power plant system. in G2
devclopment environme nt, to testify the proposed methodology.
1.5 O rga niza tion of this T hesis
Six chapters arc included in this thesis . In Chapte r I, the knowledge of SIS. safety
analysis and statistical process controJ arc introduced . The objectives of this research arc
also prcscntcdi nthischaplcr. lnC haptcr2 ,t hccxistingfauhdiagnosis methods arc first
reviewed . Then, an innovative methodology of fault diagnosis and safety managcment fcr
process system is propose d and verified theoretically. At last, the G2 develo pment
envi ronmen t is introduced. In Chaptcr 3, thc proposcd methodology isim plcmen led and
verified in the G2 development environment through developing a tank fiJlingsyslcm.
Meanwhile, thc proposcd methodology is testified that it neither depends on any model .
nor depends on largehistoricaJ data. To demonstrate the advan tages of the preposed
mClhodology,3comparisonbctwccn thc tankfillingsystcmdevelopcdwiththcproposed
mcthodology and a traditional design for the same system is held . In Chaptcr 4, thc
proposed methodology is further implemen ted and verified in thc G2 developmen t
environment through developing another process system. the steam power plant system
In the meantime , a techniqu e breakth rough is made in this chapter. At the end orthis
chapte r. a comparison between the steam power plant system developed with the
proposed methodology and the traditional expert systems method for the same system is
held. In Chapter 5, the ten characteristics of the proposed methodology arc listed. In
Chapter 6, conclusion for this proposed methodology is made. and the future works for
this research arc presented
Cha pter 2 l\leth odology of Risk-based SPC Fault Diagnosis
and Safetyl\l an agementforProeess System
2. 1 Rc, 'iewuf E,i stin g F:lUltlli al:nusisi\! cth ods
In the area of process fauhdiagnosis,thctcnn fault isgcnerallydcfincd as a departure
from an acceptable range of an ObSCT\'cdvariable or a calculated parameter associated
with 3 process (Himmclblau. 1978). This defines a fault as a process abnonnalityor
symptom , such as high temperature in a reactor or low product quality and soon. The
undcrlingcause(s)ofthisabnonnality.suchasa failed coolant pump 0 ra controller , is
(arcj called the basic evenqs) or the root causc{s). The basic event is also referred to as a
malfunction ora faiJurc. Early detection and diagnosis of process faults while the plant is
stillopcratinginacontrollablc rcgioncanhclpavoidabnonnalc\'cnt progrcssionand
reduce productivity loss
From a modcling pcrspccuvc.uhcrc are methods that requ ire accurate process models,
semi-quantitative models. or qualitative models. On the other hand.fh crc arc mcthods that
don ol assumc anyfonn ofm odcl infonn ation andr cly only onhi storicaI process data. We
broadly classify fault diagnosis methods into three genera l C3tCgOries. They arc
quanti tativcmodel-basoo mcthods,qualilativemodcl.bascdmcthods,and process history
based methods (Venkatasubramanian ct al.. 2003) . Thcclassification of fault diagnosis
methods arc shown in Fig. 13.

There are abundant literatures on process fault diagnosis approac hcs which range from
analytical redundancy to knowledge-based systems and neural networks. Ghetie et al
(1998) propose a fault diagnosis approach using balance equations methodsandthe
algorithmic redundancy. In this approac h, they illustrate the algor ithmic redundancy
concept using two representative fault detection and isolation methods based on balance
equat ions. An approach of modc1-based fault diagnosis using know ledge base and fuzzy
logic technique is presented by Mohamed et al. (2002 ). The input/output measurements
are used to generate analytic symptoms. IIcuristic symptoms observed by the operator or
based on the process history are another source for fault diagnosis. Lo cr al. (2006)
develop an intelligent supervisory eoordinator (lSC) fot proccss supervisionandfault
diagnosis in dynami c physical systems. A qualitative bond graph modeling scheme,
integratingartifi cial-inteIIigencet echniques withc ontrol engineering, isu sedt o construet
the knowledge base of the ISC. The model type which the ana lytical approac hes can
handle is limited to linear, and in some cases , to very specific nonlinear models. For a
general nonlinear model, linear approximations can prove to be poor and hence the
effectiveness of these methods might be greatly reduced. Model-based fault diagnosis
requires accurate process model s. while the computational complexityin real-time fault
diagnostic systems and the difficulty in developing accurate process models make this
approach impractical in real industrial processes. Albazzaz and Wang (2004) propose a
monitoring and fault diag nosis method for proeess by derivingSPCeh arts basedon lCA
(lndependent Component Analysis).He et al. (2006)present anoveI process fault
detection and diagnosis techn ique based on principal componen t analysis (PCA). The
proposed method reduces the dimensionality of the orig inal data sctb yth eprojection of
the data set onto a smaller subspace defined by the prineipal eomponents through PCA. A
major limitation of PCA-based monitoring is that the PCAm odel is time invariant, while
most of the real processes are time-varyi ng. Hence the PCA model should also be
recursively updated. Simani and Fantuzzi (2000) propose a FDI (Faull Diagnosis and
Identification) methodology. This FDI methodology consists of two stages. In the first
stage , the fault is detected on the basis of residuals generated from a bank of Kalman
filters; in the second stage, fault identificat ion is obtained from pattern recognition
tcchniqucsimplcmcntcdbyNcural Nctworks. To cnhancc faul tdiagnosis reliability,
especial ly when the data avai lable for train ing the network arc not abundant
when reasonin g with qualitative models. From indust rial application viewpoint,
single method has all lhe desim blejeo lll1l!Sone ....'OlIld /ikeodiagnosticsys lf:m topoS .H!.'U
Il is ollr ~·iewlhal some ojlhesemethocls C'on C'omplemenl one anolher1l!sulling in better
diugnostic sys tems. Integrating these complementaryfeatures is one way to develop
hybr id S}'slemslhal C'ollld o\'f!rrometh e/imii alions o!indi\'idual soIlIlionslr alegies."
In this situation for fault diagnosis in proccsscnginccrin g and the aforemen tioned (in
Chap tcrJ}safctyincidcntshappcncd inproccss industricsthat leadto the serious
consequences for people, the environm ent and property, it is important and irnpcrativc Ior
our researchers to find an effect ive method to pcrfonn the fault diagnosis and safety
management 10 the process system. These factors motivated the proposal of an innovativc
methodology ofri sk-bascdSPC fault diagnosis and its imcgra rion with SIS for process
2.2 1'roposed ;\le thodo logy
Since there arc various bewildering fault diagnosis approac hes in process engineering.
and for the existing methods, quantitative model-based methods, qualitative model-based
mcthods und process history based methods, each of them has its limitations, it is not an
idea l so lution for us to follow one branch in the class ification of diag nostic algorithms
shown in Fig. l3 ,no rt hc hybrid systems solution proposed byVcn katasubramanian ct aI..
Statistical approach is easy 10 build and it perfo rms considcrably wcll on fast detection of
abnormal situations, and it has been successfully implemented in industrial applicat ions.
but it bclongsto the conventional process history based mcthod,that means it needs a
largc amount of historical proccss dala.l f wc cut thc dcpcndcncc bctwccn statistical and a
large mount of historical process data which arc rcquircd by thcconvcntional proccss
history based method in Fig. 13. and we do not usc any branches below statistical mcthod.
i.c.• PCAlPLS or Statistical Classi fiers, then this brand new approach is desired 10 be an
ideal solution for this process fault diagnosis problem, because it will neither depend on a
large amount of historical process data, nor have the limitat ions from PCAIPLS or
Statistical Classifiers methods. Bused on these thoughIS, an innovative methodology,
risk-based Statistica l Process Control (SPC) fault diagnosis and its integral ion with SIS
for process system. has been proposed . Thc pathway of the proposed approaeh for fault
diagnosis in the classification of diagnostic algorithms is shown in Fig. 14
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2.3V.ri lica tionor Propos.dFau ll ()jal:nosis;\l.t hodolo~·
In order 10 theoret ically verify the proposcd risk-based SPC faultdiagnosis mcthodolo gy,
historical data from The rmodynam ics and Fluids Lab in Faculty of Enginecring and
Applied Science at Memorial University of New foundland will bc used in this analysis .
These historic al data arc the steam pressures of the steam power plant in the
The rmodyna mics and Fluids Lab. Historical data obtai ned during 12:49 p.m. thro ugh
12:58 p.m. on July 13, 2006 arc taken to do Ihc \'erific3tion. Thc stcam prcssurc dala in
normal operatio n arc shown in Table 4 (norma l situati on). A fault event is simulated in
this limcperiod,andthccoITCsponding,dJtaarcshowninTablc5 (abnormalsirualion},
Table~ : Slum Pr essure Data rOT the Stram Power Plant (Ne rma l Situati on )
T:lhlcS:Slea m llress u re n ala for thcS te llm l' ower I1hlUl(A bnu r ma lS ilua tio l1)
In this risk -based SPC fault diagnosis methodol ogy, moving avcrage technique wil! be
utilized. To increase the sens itivi ty of the risk-based SPC fault diagnosis mcthod 10 1hc
faul t event . the number of data points, 3, is chosen to do the moving avera ge calculat icn .
The steam press ure data obtained fornonnal situation and abnorma l sima tion arc sho wn
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2.3.2S I'CFauIl Diagnosis
I, Normality Test to the Moving Average Stearn Pressure Data
In order 10 test if the moving average steam pressure da ta arc nonn ally distributcdcthc
normality tests in Minitab IS arc conducted. The results arc shown in Fig. 17 and Fig
Fig. 17 is the normality test for the moving average steam pressure data in the Steam
Power Plant System in normal operation. From Fig. 17, we can sec that: The P-Valuc
>O.IOO(that is. P-Valuc>o.05); RJ::-O.990, is ,"cry cJosc to I. So thc mo\·(ng avcragc stcam
prcssurcdata aren onn allyd istribulCd.
1600 62D 640 660 680 100 720
Fig. 18 is the nonna lity tcst [or the moving average steam pressure data in the Steam
PowcrPl ant Syslcm in abnonnal situ3tion, From Fig. 18, wc can sceth at: Thc Pvvaluc >
0.100 > 0.05; RJ=O.981. is very close to I. So the moving average steam pressure data arc
If the process is in normal operation. according to the three-sigma rule, the moving
average steam pressure data points should fall into the ILCl . Ve l] . i.e., [590lPa.
690kPa]; otherwise, there could be a fault event. Plotting the moving average steam
prC'SsurcdatainExcel2003,thefollowingresultsareobtaincd.assho\\ninFig. 19 and
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Fromthc:abo\·cchart..wccansccthatthcsixthdalapoinlfallsoutsidcthe[590,690].so
theprocess is suspected to be abnormal , i.e.. there could bea fault.
2.3.3 Ri, k-based SPC F. ult Dlagnesls
To minimize the number of false alarm ,risk or risk indicator concept is introduced into
the proposed faultdiagnosismcthodologylOidcntifyanddctcrminepotcntial fault()
Risk is estimated for each deviation in the predicted values of control variables • using
probability oflbe deviation and ilSassociatcdscvC'rily.ThC'probabilit)'ofthe faultis
assessed using three-sigma rule . whereas the severity is assessed using the dcviatio nfrom
thc predcfined thresbold valuets]
Acco rding 10 the defin ition to thc proccss n sk. thc culculauon of the risk ofa fault in this
research is ns follows.
P (F) is the probability of fault. P(F)=;( ·' -(J~+3U)1
Sis lhe~'"Verityoffault. 5=100'''' ·
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function (non-elementary) of sigmoid shape which occurs in probabi lity, stat istics,
materials science, and partial different ial equatio ns. It is defined as (cn.wikipcdia.org}
The intcgrand j v cxp (-Z 2) and j v crf {z) are shown in the complex z-planc in Fig. 22
and Fig. 23.
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detect this deviation in advanee, and evaluate its risk,lhen takeeorrespondingaet ion(s)
promptly. After implement ing the proposed strategy of SIS1 and SIS2, the Safety
Integri ty Level (SIL) of the safety system has upgraded from SILl to SIL3.
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• Monitoring. diagnosis, and alarm handling.
• Supcrvisory and edvanccd controt .
• Process design, simulation. and re-enginccring.
• Dccisions upponforcntcrprise-widcopcra tions.
G2devclopmentenvironmcntisagraphicalcnvironmcnt.Almostcycrything in G2 has a
graphical representation. Thesystcm-defincddisplayilcmsinG2canshowthcstatcof
the applica tion as it changes over timc, and the sys tem-defined buttons can be used to
send commands to G2 or the outside world. Besides, G2 uses a structured natural
language in programming statements. The G2 language is similar to ordinary human
language,so lhea pplicationdc\'clopmentprogrammedwithG2languagcis easier to read
Gz offcrs Gatcwey Srandard Interfacc (GSI) network and intcrfacingeapability. ThcG2
Ga teway Standard Interface (GSI) is a network-orien ted toolkit used for developing
software interfaces, or bridges, between G2 and other, external sys tems. G2 Ga teway
allows Klf s to cxcbangc various types of data betw een a G2 process andth ebrid gc.
GDA,theG2DiagnosticA ssistant, is ai aycredprodu clbuih ontop ofG2. GDAi s a
visual programming cnvironmcnlfo rd cvelopingin tclligcntapplica lions that moni tor and
control real-time processes. AG DA application contains schematie diagrams that
• Acquircdatafromreal -timeproccsses .
• Make inferences based on the data.
• Take actions based on thc inference valuC5,such as raising alarms, sendingmcssages
The principal component of the GOA is a graphical language mat lets you express
complex diagnostic procedures as a diagram of blocks, also callcd an Information Flow
Diagram (IFD). Thcscbl ocks arc conncelcdb yp aths that show how datatl ows through
GUIDE. Ihc G2 Graphical User Interface Development Environmen l,isadc:vclopmcnt
toolthat enablcs uscrstocrc31cgraphicaluscrintcrfaces(GUI's)forG 2 applications . A
G2 GU IDE user interface can be cons tructed by using the graphical componcntscalled
UIL (User lnlerface Library)co nlrols.GU IDElUIL providcsanapplication programmer's
inlerface (API) 10 procedures that control dialogs and otherclementsofagraphicaluscr
inlcrfacc.GUIDEsu pponsditTerentciasscsofUILcontro lsfordiITcrentpurposes'
• Some classes ofUIL controls, such as edit bcxcs. Bunons. and scroll areas . cnab lc
users 10 view and edit the data stored in object annbutcs . TheditTerent classes are
suitablefo rvicwingandcditingditTercnttypcsofdata.
• OtherciasscsofUILconlro ls, such as borders and separators , enable users to organize
a user interface visua lly.
In this research. integrated G2 development environment , i.c., the integration ofG2 &.
GOA & GUIDE,is used iodevelop3pplieation syslcms inciudingthc Tank Filling
System and the Steam Power Plant System, and is also used 10 verify the proposed
methodology of risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and safely management for process
sys tem. Recently, most fault diagnosis using G2 software employ the expert sys tem
approac h. To demonstra te the advantages of the proposed methodology over expert
system, a eomparison will be held between these two approaches in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 Implementation and Verifi eation of the Prop osed
Methodology in G2 Developm ent Enviro nme nt -
Tank Fillin g System
In ordcr to testify thc proposcd mcthodology of risk-bascd SPC fault diagnosis and safcty
managemen t for process system, from this chapter 10 next chapte r, two process systems
areb uihinG2dcvelopmcntcnvironmcnt.Thcfirstprocl."Sssystcmisatankfillingsystcm.
a tank level monitor. in process industry , as will be described and studied in this chaptcr .
Thcsccond process system isa steam power plant systemlocated in Thermodynamics
and Fluids lab in Faculty of Enginccringand Applied Science building at Memorial
UnivcrsityofNcwfoundland,3swi lllx dcscribcdandsludicdinChaptcr ·t
In this chapter, the proposed meth odology is implemented and verified in the G 2
developm ent env iron ment through developin g a tank filling system, Meanwhile. the
proposed methodology is testif ied thai it neither depends on any modcl, nor dcpends on
large historical data. At thecnd of this chaptcr, lo demonstralc the advantages of' the
proposcdmcthodology, a comparisollb clwccn thcl ank filling syslcmdcvclopcd wilhlh e
proposcdm clhodology and at radit ional dcsign ror thc samc system is held.
3.1 Requ ir ements 10 th e Ta nk Fillin~ S)' sI Cll1
In this chap ter, 3 tank lillingsystcm, i.c., a tank level monitor,istc bc dcvcloped in G2
development environment. In this system. tank is filled with inflow liquid through a
manual valve. The basic process control to this filling system is tomai ntainthecontrollcd
variable , the tank level, at some desired value, i.c., the set point. If some disturbance
causes the tank level devia te away from its set point, some protec tion laycrs , i.c., safety
instrumented systems, should be added into this system to ensure systcm safcry. The tank
filling systcm 10 bc developed should havc the following functions :
• Poppingupwamingmessagewhenranklevelrcachessomelimit;
• Raisingalannwhcntanklevclexeecdsuppcrconrrollimit;
• Raising alarm when there is a fault and then shut down the system;
• Raising alarm and shut down the system immediately when there is an excessi ve
According to the requirements to the tank filling system to be developed, three
develo pment stages will be conducted and studied in three subsequent sections . These
three developmen t stages arc deterministic stage, SPCstage and risk-based SPC stage.
In deterministic stage, the console forthcunk filling system containing basic process
control system BPCS, protection laycrSISI and protection layerSIS2 is built in G2
develo pment environment, and the basic functions forLhis fillingsyste m are provided
In SPC stage, statistical technique of moving average is used to filter out the noise
disturbances. Statistical technique of control chart is uscd to momtor thc tankl cvcli n thc
whole process of the tank filling system. Bcsidcs,t ocn sure an cvcnt is a fault, the fault is
defined as three successive data points of tank level cxcccd thc upper controll imil 6m . ln
risk-based SPC stage, risk indicator is introduced into the methodology 10 reduce the
numbc r of falsc ularms. real time rnonitor ing to the process is performed , and forecast
function to the faul t event is conducted
""_.'~.._"'-_.."'-""-
-.-..._ ...._- "" .. ,.. __.
"., ..~..-. __...""" ""_ _...~.
......_ :0 •
I ..~ __..._-._ BI'CS.-.-...r•
.. F.. ~. ... ....-.__ ......... _ ..... M\ '.l __ •
-..I~.__ ~l ""1Ir('S • .-.- _l.S-I• •
___ LC_ __ C\ '·. ""_ .BI'('S ••
_...__ ,..,..
If Ik__*'-_ _ ..~ _
_.----......-..,.._ _..._.
__.....,.F.Z6-.Ik'... .,.. _~..,..01
'""'J __ .,,-S1SI
' '! ' ~-J
.. SISI.F.:l6.lkSI$I.__..r.__LS-l • • _SC.I-.l1k
_,_MV.I.rf_._~Ik_ _ ""'....,._ .. ...
_' SlSl .. ,'I"""'"" ..~ __ -.l..,__ .. tw.o.,lk
oy>ImI ", I...., SISI. .... .... .."LS-l_ ....-
lOIIklowl.,r" I<o-<I"' _,.•.•• foull ..,'l\ow<ns. "'•
........ J< .. ,n""""P"' ,.,..lf .... lOIIk I «<b urra ......
h""'6m. I........ ·'lIbtronodlo.""_or -.. }"I<m.ond,f ....
."..,..... r "'__ ...._ .. op«>flOd"""'I""""! v..""MV·I
... U... __ -.coItytw,- .... _SC·1
.5lSI _ • •...-_~ ...... _lo<foR _
_ __._....... F_>Ofcr) .... ......
.._._--._.,........., "",-~ _.....,.
...._.l~. _ ....... n. . .. _ ~..,....
Sls;o·"illIaI_.-..F.. n
!!I.... _-
.. F.. :1 .SlS:· __ .. fiIInt~._... .,..,..>Ofcr)SlS:.
__ol.lo>ot_U-l• • _SC·l.. *"'_
~"w\lV·1 ... SISl ...-..- I_I<wI. .... _IJ'l'l*d.anabIo ..
Ih< .. n...._.~ "' """"""" ~" no._ .._ .."ol
oompl<" Jf "' «Wn>nl ot<"K<lo _I,m"~m'"'''.lh
."n.'h« llfmI" nnu... """'m_wnplot, p<1'lOdond <vr><nl ...... kv<I.......
..,.,.,""""'"'_h< h<f fnlt hoppmo" k-od ..o:<><>6ollw
_1<,,", ~l»'_SISl ~or-. faooI'~ ...b<_ _foooI .~._"""Iooo...,.""I'ft"'<'Il ~ ..r..,_
-,
sa.._. -' -,.--,-
~ .......I ~II sa.-' .. ....,..._ ..._._.
,_" ..~ .. SII.I_ -,_..._-,...
'_"-.,I~u_ot l....I _lf._. .... I_f... !oo_
s,-C_rro.-w .....__ ~
.U
F.-T_,, 1\... ~-_..,......S1SI.. S1s:. ...
_YIot)'.....,._..__ -~I.SILI
· '- __----.. ... _S.• ~ ..-__I.
·__..__ ....... _.t_.. ... .,...
___ ........l.ml~
· "'-..------_ -..- ... .,..
-.ot,._......._..-_ _I.S1s:~
3.3 SI' C Development Stage
In the dctcnninisticdcvelopmcntSI.1gc.onlya set of detcrrninistic results can be obtained .
there arc not noise filtering technique applied to Ute filling system to Iiltcr out noise
disturbances which could lead 10 false alarms , and the developed fault diagnosis function
cannol pcrformrcaltimcmonitoringtothcwholcproccss. lna ddition . the determina tion
of the fault is that one data point of tank level exceeds the upper limit 6 m,thcn the
actions like raising alannand shutting down the system will be taken, which willincrcasc
the probability of false alarms. Therefore , SPC fault diagnosis and safety management
(SIS) & SIS2) method is introduced 10 overcome the aforementioned disadvarua gcs in
deterministic development stage .
In SPC dcvclopmcnt stagc. statistical tcchniquc of moving a\'cragc is used to filtcr out the
noise disturbances . Statistical tcchniquc of control chan is used to monitor the tank level
in the whole process of the tank filling system. Besides, using control chart and
three-sigma rule. if thrce successive data points of tank level excccd thc uppcr limit a m,
then this is defined as a fault event.
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3.4 Risk- based SP CD evelopm enl Slage
Although in SPC development stage, the developed fault diagnosis and safety
managcmen[ syslcm ovcrcomcs thc disadvantagcs cxisting in dctcnninistic stage, there is
not forecast capability in thc SPC fault diagnosis and safety managcmcntstagc.Forccasl
capability is a very important characte ristic fora fault diagnosis and safety management
system. Using forecast capability, potential risks of the industrial processes can be
identified andcoITctcd,thus it can reduce the hazards 10 people, property and
environment. Another drawback in SPC stage is the number of the alarms is still high
Besides, in SPC stage , real time monitoring function has not been implemented
In order to minimize the numbcr of alanns, perform real time monitoring to the processes
and conduct forecast function 10 the fault event, the methodology of risk-based SPC fault
diagnosis and its integration with safety instrumented system SlSI & SIS2 is introduced
in this stage. The developed console for the tank filling system is shown in Fig. 29. Since
this risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and its integration with safety instrumented system
SISl & SIS2 is the finalized proposed methodology, it will be described in detail as
below
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wheneverstand-mov-ave receives a value
and when stand-mov-ave s 0.0 then
ccnclude that crr-func v error-
function(0.7071 · stand-mov-ave)
Topcrfonn the best linear trend forecast the previous three data points are used 10 do the
best fit fora line, so we can obtain the best fit value for the third point and the rare of
change , i.c., the slope, of the best fit line. With this best tit line. we Can predict the value
of next (fourth) data point. The data points of tank level moving average and their
forecasted data points arc shown in Fig. 31. Since what we conccm inthisfill ing syslcm
is whether the tank level exceeds the upper limil, onlyth c uppcr ccntrc llimit is drawn in
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• Raising alarm with severity a when a fault happcns.obuning down the systcmand
highlightingthcvalve MV-lingrccn.
3A.3 T hc Dc\'elopmcnt ofS IS2
In SIS2, to detect fault and take corresponding actions, the inflow rate is measured by
FS·1. After filtered out noise by using moving average technique wi th sample size 3.
these inflow f3 IC data become inflow rate moving average data. Thcn through performing
linear trend forecast with sample size 3 and time horizon 5 seconds, the predicted tank
Icvclvalucscan bco btaincdfromthcscrcaldataoftanklcvclmovingavcragc.Usingthc
prcdictcd tanklc"e l. the currcnt oulflow f3lc andl hc currcol tank lc\'c1. we can obtain thc
predicted lank level. Later, through doing risk calculation to the predicted tank level data,
we can obtain the values of risk indicator, and then take corresponding actions like raising
alarm or shutting down system according to the risk values
The results of fault diagnosis in SIS2 arc shown in Fig. 35 and Fig. 36
~\ .I~~.. .
In Fig. 35.X axis is the real time, and Yaxi s is lank level. TI1Cblackcurvc is the real tank
lcvc l cu rvc, and thc grccn cu rvci sthcprcd iclcdtanklcvcl culVc{ N'ofc: The predict ed
lank Icvcl po int is aligned with real tank leve l point by tim e, i.c ., at the same time, the
black point is the current Icvcl, and the green point is the prcdictcdl cvcl).F rornlh is
ligurc,wccanscc:when two succcssivcrcaltanklcvcldalapoinisarc above mean value
5 m, and Ihc third prcdiclcd data poinl cxcccds thc uppcr conlTOl limit fi mcorrcsponding
10 the unaccep table risk limit S,thc system will beshut down.
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Real time monitoring and forecast functions arc essential to the fault diagnosis in process
systems. In these two developed systems, both have real time monitoring function.
However, there is not any chart in Cen Nan's system for visual display. and there is not
forecast function in Cen Nan's systemcither. While in the author's system, we can
pcrfonnthcbcst lineartrcndforccasttothccontrollcdvariablc,thctanklevcl ,andtrend
chart is used to display the real data points and the predicted data points in rcal time.
The fault diagnosis in Cen Nan's systcmis indctcnninisticmodc,and thcrc are not SPC
fault diagnosis development and risk-based SPCdcvclopment, sothc numbcroffalsc
alarms is very high. In author's system. SPCcontrol chart technique is uscd todistinguish
abnormal situation from normal situation, and risk indicator is introduced into the fault
diagnosis to minimize the number of false alarms.
The comparison between author's work for the tank filling system and Ccn Nan's work is
Cne ra cter b tlcs Cell ~ lln ' s S)' ~Il' 1II Hulzhl Hac 's System
BPCS Yes Yes
SISI Ves Yes
SIS2 No Yes
Real Time Monitoring Yes Yes
Trend Chart No Yes
Fcrecesr Capabiliry No Ves
Deterministic Development Ves ves
SPCDc\ 'c!opmc:nl No Yes
Risk-besed Devetopmen t No Ves
NoiscFiltcring V., Yes
AddilionalHardwarcfor Ves No
Noise Filtering
SIL
C IHlpter 4 1mpieme nlationandVerifiea tio nof the Prop osed
i\le thodology in G2 Developm ent Enviro nme nt
- Steum Power Plunt Syste m
The conve ntional SPC control chart method. which belongs to process history based
method because a large amount of historical data arc needed , W3S introduced into the
process fault diagnosis in 1931 as the Shewbart control chan , and followed by othcrs such
as the cumulative sums chart in 195~. As the demand for product quality and process
reliabi lity is growing . the conventional SPC charts have been extensively used in
industrial processes .AlthoughthcconvcntionalSPCmcthodisstillvalidnow, it has vital
limita tion tha t thcconvcntional SPCchan is a univariate control chart, and it can not
handle multivariate processes and the corre lation among controlled variablcs, thus MSPC
techniques arc extensively studied anduscd in industrial processes. Another vital
limitat ion for the conve ntional SPC melhod is in the data acquis ition tcchnology, These
two reasons are why the SPC method is not writtcn into any branch in Fig. l3 .
In this chapler, the proposed innov3live melhodology of risk-bllscd SPC fauh diagnosis
and its integration with SIS is furtheri mplemented and verified in the G2 development
environment through developing another process system, the steam power plant system.
In the meant ime, a technique breakthrough, from univaria te monitoring to multivariate
monitoring for SPC fault diagnosis, is made in this chapter , To demonstrate the
advantagcsofthe proposcdmelhodologyoverothertr3ditional methods .atlhecndofthis
chapter , a comparison between the steam power plant system developed with the
proposed methodology and the traditional expert systems method for the same system is
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The set points and maximums of the three parameters of the boiler arc as follows: the set
point and the maximum of the steam flow rate are 160 Kgtll and 166 KgIll separately,
For the steam pressure, they are 6-l0 kPa and 690 kPa separately. For the steam
(emperature, thcyare2 19 °C and 239 °C scparately.W hen a fault eyent happcns in any
individual controlled variable, safety system 5151 should pop up a warning message
When any risk of the three controlled variable isg rcatert han 20, theS1SI shouid raise an
alarm of shutting down the system with scvcruy a . When the overall risk for the thrce
parameters is in range 5-10, safety system 5152 should pop up a warning message. When
the overall risk is in range 10-20, the 5152 shouldpopupa severe warning message.
When the overall risk is greater than 10. the SIS2 should raise an alarm ofsh utnng down
the system with severity 4.
Accordi ngtothedescriptionlothesleampowcrplanlsystcm.thede\"elopcdconsolefor
this system is shown in Fig. -ll on next page .
In this consolec thereare mainly seven subworkspaces v Tbey are Procedure . Function.
Rule. Diagnosis. Cbans . As umption and GDA Interface ubworkspaces . The Procedure
workspace contains all the procedure. method and parameter definitions used In thi
development.All the functions used in thi ystcm arc defined in the Function workspace ,
and all the rules are defined in the Rule workspace . Tbc functions offaul1 diagnosis and
safely management 515 1 & 5152 are implemented in the Diagnosis workspace. The
Chan workspace provides the real time trend charts and risk chans for the three
controlled variables of the boiler in the steam power plant system. In the A sumption
workspace, some assumptions about this system are listed, and in the GDA Interface
workspace, some source signals arc provided. In the steam power plant system. the three
controlled variables arc the steam flow rate, the steam pressure and steam temperature of
the boiler. The BPCS for the steam now rate consists of a flow sensor SG·FS-I , a
controller SG-PC· l and a control valve SG·ev·\. The BPCS for the steam pressure
consists of a pressure sensor SG-PS· J, a controller SG·I'C-2 and a control valve SG·CV-2.
The BPCS for the steam temperature consisis of a temperature sensor SG-TS-I , a
controller SG-PC-3 and a controlva lvc SG-CV·3.
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The proposed methodology of risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and its integrat ion with SIS
is implemented in 02 development environment in two stages, that is, SPC stage and
risk-based SPC stagc. These rwc dcvclopmcru stages will be conducted and studied in
two subsequent sections. In src development stage, control chart is used to distinguish
abnormal situation from normal variation of controlled variable based 0 n three-sigma rule
and linear trend forecast. To minimize lhc numbcroffatscalanns, in risk-based SPC
dcvclopmcnt stagc, risk indic3tors arc uscd to idc:nlify and dclcnn inc potcntial fault(s)
In the steam power plant system shown in Fig. ~ I . the controlled variables arc three
parameters of the boiler. that is. the steam flow rate , the steam pressure and steam
temperature. Inn onn al situation. the eorresponding BPCS maintains individual comrollcd
variable at its set point. When there is a fault or the risk value exceeds some limits. safety
instrumented systems should provide warnin g messages or raise alarms of shutting down
~.4 .1 src Developm ent Stage
In SPCdeve lopment stage, control chart of the individual controllc d variable is developed.
To illustrate this development stage, one of the controlled variables, l.he boiler steam
pressure, is chosen to condu ct the procedure. In this stage, all the functions that Cen
Nan's sys tem has have bccn completed. To demonstrate the effectiveness 0 fthisS PCfau h
diagnosis system, an experiment ishcld in this stage .
In the fault diagnosis module. the main task is to construct and deve lop the contro l charts
for the process variables . Control chart is used to distinguish abnormal situation from
normal variation of controlled variable based on three-sigma rule.
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From tbis cxpcrimem. we can scc thcSPC fault diagnosis is more effectiveand accuratc
in fault diagnosis in process system. Using control chan , the controlled variable is
mon itored and disp layed clearly. This feature makes the SPC fault diagnosis approach
more intuitive. In addition. the SPC fault diagnosis approach is more compact than thc
traditional knowledge-based real time (KBRn approach. i.e.• the traditional expert
4A .2 Risk-based SPC Developm ent Stage
In SPC development stage. there is not forecast capability in the steam power plant
sys tem, the numbcrofthe alarms is still high. and thc function of real time monitoring has
not been implemented In order to minimize the number of alarms, perform real time
monitoring 10 the processes and conduct forecast function to the fault event, the
methodology of risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and its integration with safely
instrumcntcd systcmS ISI &SIS 2i sin troduced inthi s stage.Atcchniquebr eakthrough,
from univariate monitoring to multivariate monitoring forSP C faultd iagnosis, is made in
this stage, and so is the correlation problem among multiple variables. The developed
cunsole fort hcstca mpowcr plants ystcm is shown in Fig. 3H.Sinc c this risk-bascd Sl'C
fault diagnosis and its integration with safety instrumcntcd systcm SISI & SIS2 is the
finalizcdpr oposedm cthodology.itwillbedc scribcdindctail asb cIow.
I. The Implementation of Risk Calculation inG2 Dcvclopmcnt Environment
AccordingtothcriskcalculationanalysisinChaptcr2forrisk-ba"cd SPCfaultdiagnosis,
thCcqu3tionsa reo braincdasfolJows:
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whenever sland-pred-vaJ-f receives a value
and when sland-pred-val-f > 0.0 then
conclude that pred-err-Iunc-l « error-
function-f(0.7071 ' stand-pred-vaJ-f)
Topcrfonn the best Iineartrcnd foreca st, the previous three da ta points arc used to do the
bcsllitforaline,sowccanobtainth cbcstfilvalucforthclhirdpointandthcratcof
change , i.e.• the slope , of the best fit line. with this best fil line, wc canprcd ict the value
of next (fourth) data point.
Fault is defined as three successive data points exceed SOI11C limitfsj. Tn thcsc thrcc dnta
poinls, two succcssivc datap oinis arcl hc rcal valucs ofth cm oving average of contro lled
variable, and the third success ive data point is the predicted valucofthc movingavcragc
of controlled variable . In SISI , when two successive rea l data points of the moving
average of controlled variable exceed the uppcrcontrol limit, and thcthird successive
predicted data point exceed s the upper control limit. correspondin g to the unacccptable
risk limit S.th is event is defined as a fault.
In SPC stage. the monitoring to the controlled variable is not in real time. Topcrfonn real
time monitoring to the processes . trend chart is introduced imo thc dcvclopmcm to the
stcam powcr plant systcm to display thc rcsults for SIS l and SIS2.
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In this stage, there are three controlled variables in the steam power plant system, they arc
the steam flow rate, the steam pressure and steam temperatu re of the boiler. The fault
diagnosis procedure for every controlled variabl e is same with the descript ion for the
controlled variable of tank level in SIS1 of the risk-based SPC stage in the tank f illing
system. When two successive real data points of the moving average of controlled
variable exceed the uppcr conrrol Iimit. and the third successive predicted data point
cxcccds lheu ppcr control limit,co rrespondingto lhcu nacceptablc risk limit 5, lhiscYCnl
is dcfinedasa fault. When a fault happens in any individual controlled variablcc safcty
systcmS IS l pops upawami ng mcssag c. \Vhcnany riskoflhc thrce controllcdvaria breis
greater than 20. lheSISI raises an alarm ofs huning down the system with severity a .
When the overa ll risk for the three controlled variab les is in range 5·10 . safety system
SlS2 pops up a warning message; when the overal l risk is in range 10·20• the SlS2 pops
up a severe warning message; when the overa ll risk is greater than 20• the SIS2 raises an
alann of shuning down the system with scvc riry a. In this process, as can be seen, the
corrcl:ltions among lhc lhrcccolltrolledvariablcsarc thesummationof risksof lhree
controlled variables is in range 5- 10, 10-20 or greater than 20.
The rcsults ofthe fault diagnosis for thes tcam Ilow ratcthe stcarn prcssure and thc stcam
temperature of the boiler are shown in the Fig.5 1.
In Fig. 51, we can sec thai the three controlled variables , i.e.• the steam flow rate. the
sicampressurcandthc stcamtcmpcrarurc ofthcboilcr, arcbc ingm onilorcd and analyzcd
simuhancously.sothisproccssisamultivariatcm oniloring.

~
I -...~ ..~,.. ..~ _,..."'-.
o..c.. ... _ .......__ _ .......
: ..------_..._.- -----
.........-.........._--.....- _----
----_....-
---- ..- ~,
. 0, 0'
'.1"/\..\ f=
•..;;~~~_I=
--
"""'"" __ .'} ",,-,"... _.3C

• When any of the risk (risk of steam pressure , risk of steam now rate, or risk of steam
temperature) is greater than 20.1he system raises the alarm ofshuuing down the
• Whcn the overall risk (risk of steam pressure + risk of steam flow rate + risk of steam
tempera ture) is in range 5-10, the system pops up warning message .
• When the overall risk is in range 10-20, the system pops up severe warning mcssage.
• When the overall risk is greater than 20, the system raises thealann of shutt ingdown
the system with sevcriry of a
In order 10 indicate the values of individual variable and its predicted value when they
reach the extreme value, the following alarms arc added:
raises an alarm with severity of 2.
4A .2.3 Comparisonwilh T r ad ili on a I Ap p roa ch
Todemonstraletheadvantagesoftheproposcdmcthodologyoverolhcrtraditional fault
diagnosi s and safety management approaches , a comparison between the proposed
risk-bascdSPCmclhodandlhckoowJcdgc-bascdrcallimc(KBRTJapproachdc\'cloped
by Ceo Nan for the same steam power plant system is held as follows
In the KBRT system, there is only one controlled variable, the steam pressurcoftheboiler,
so it is univariate contro l. While in the risk-based SPC system , there arct hrcc conirollcd
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In the KBRT system. the outputs ofFOO and son depend on the most recent five
discrete input data. so the quality of those data could affect the accuracy ofi dentificaticn.
This primitive identification approach creates en instantancous rccognition and the result
cannot be changed later. Besides. in order 10 obtain accurate and reasonable results. the
membership functions used in the analysis 10 the system OUlpUI have 10 be adjusled for
dilTcrcnl faultcv cnts everyt ime.ln risk·bascdSP C syslcm.l hc original real lime data are
directly used as the input to the fault diagnosis system, and the output of the fault
diagnosis system are the exact dat3.ln this way. we can avoid input dependency. and
assure the accuracy in system output. Bcsidcs.sinccbothinpulandoutput are cxact data ,
thecorresrondingriskasscssmenttothesystemareal~exac(results
In the KBRT system. noise is a major problem in primitive identification. There is no
noise canceling technique used in this primitive identification approacb. Thc input scnsor
data need to be filtered before performing any analysis. Whilc in risk-bascd SPC system,
moving average techniquei s used to eliminate the noise disturbance
In thc KBRT syslcm. due to the unccrtain characlerislic of primitive identification and the
similar shape between some primitives, it is impossible 10 perform an exact comparison.
SOCCIl Nan introduced SI to decide the degree of approximation to do the trend analysis
While in risk-based SPC system. all thc input. output and risk assessment arc exact data
In the KBRT system, 10 quantify the temporal pattcm of scnscr data.Den Nan intraduced
another variable ROC to act 3S an input 10 the fault diagnosis system. Besides. in G2
environment, one fuzzy e\idcnc egateonlyallowst.hreecombined if-then rules.jbc refcre.
if more rules are used. like in the KBRT fault diagnosis system, repeated or redundant
components are used. In risk.bascd SPC system.r cdundancy a\·oiding dcsign makes the
InthcKBRTsyste~thcde\'c1opcdapplieationcanonJybcefTecti"cto1heslUd ied
system(Cen etc ., 200 ). This meansthe methodologydeveloped by Cen Nan is not good
inextcnslbility.Whilctherik·ba~ PC system has excellent extensibility, 001 only II
can beapplied in the studied systems . the tank Iillmg sy tern and the steam power system .
butalsocanbcpopularizedtootherindu 5trialpcoccsscs.Furthermore.aftcrmodification.
it can be extended 10 be applied in the real nme monitonng and prediction to natural
catastrophes. such as tsunami. earthquake , etc . eed evee in economic analysis .
The comparison between the KBRTapproochand the n k-bascd SPCapprooch for the
steam power plant system is shown in Table 10.
Cha racte r-ist ics KnRT approach Risk-based SPC approach
Contro lled Variab le Univariate Multivariate
BPCS Yes Yes
SIS I No Yes
SIS2 No Yes
Rcul Timc Monitoring Yes Yes
Forecast Capa bility No Yes
Risk-based Develop ment No Yes
Noise Filtering Yes Yes
Add itional Hardw are for Yes No
Noise Filteri ng
SIL 2 3
Indcpcodcncy No Yes
Redundancy Yes No
Adaptability Not Good Excellent
Scnsiuviry to Fault Not Good Excellent
Extensibility ,' ot Good Excellent
ChapterS Characteri stics of the Propo sed l\l ethod ology
From the verificat ions and descript ions of the tank fitling systcm in Chapter 3 and the
steam power plant system in Chapter 4, we can sec that the proposed methodology of
risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and its integration with safety instrumented systems bas
thc Iollowin g characrcristic s:
I. Adaptability
In the fault diagnosis and safety management 10 process systems, data analysis la the
industrial proccsscs datai s indispcnsablc. St3tisticsis a rnathcffiaticals ciencc pcnai ning
to the collection, analysis, interpretation or explanation, and prescntation of data (MosC'S
etc.• 1986).Fr omthcprc\lious scntcncc.w cc ansccthatStat isticsexi sts for data analysis
In the proposed methodology , statistical techniques like control chart, moving averages
and lime series arc used to do data analysis 10 the real timc mcni tored process data. Since
Statistics is applicable 10 a wide vnricry of ucndcmic disciplines, including natural and
soc ial sciences, government, and business, the proposed methodology will havc cxccllcn t
adaptability to all kinds of industrial processes, and also ro orher various scientific
In thedcvelopcd system s using the proposed methodology. rcaI timc monitoring to the
controlled variable(s) is conducted . and both the inputs 10 the system and the outputs of
the system are exact real time data. Using control chart and trend chart techniques. the
outcome can be visually observed and monitored in real time. any fault or abnormal
situation can not escape 10 be captured promptly,
Forecest capability is essential to a fault diagnosis and safety managemcntsys tem. Duc to
the use of timc series and lincartr cnd analysis rcc hniques. jhe proposed methodology has
excellent fault forecast capability to the real time data. and it can pcrfcrm the best linear
trend forecast 10 the process controlled variables with G2 software. This is very hclpful
for us to take corresponding actions in advance.
The risk-based fault diagnosis and safety management system is effec tive both in fault
diagnosis and in safety management to the process system. It can capture any fault evcnt
accordingto thc fault dclinilion. Funhcnno rc, therisk-bascdSPCfauIt diagnosis and
safety management system Can forecas t the fault and lake action(s) in advance . Th is
capability hclpsu s to make precaution before faults happen and also offset the effec t after
fauhshavehappencd .AfterimplcmentingS ISI and SIS2 10 the developed systems. the
SILof thc dcvc1oped systems has upgraded from SIL2 to SIL3.
Unlike in the KBRT system. the outputs of FDD and SDD depend on the most rcccnt flvc
discrete input data. and in order to obtain reasonable results, the membcrship functions
used to analyze the system output have to beadjus ted for ditTcrent fault events every time.
In risk-based SPC system, the original real time data arc direc tly used as the input tc thc
fault diagnosis system. and the output of the fauhdiagnosis systemare the exact data. Tn
this way. we can avoid input dependency, and assure the accurac y in systcmo utput.
short-term fluctuations and highlight long-term trends . Mathematically, a moving avcrage
is also similar to the low-pass filter used in signal proccssing. Jn thc dcvclopcd risk-bascd
SPC fault diagnosis and safety manage ment systems, moving avcrage rcchn iquc is uscdto
filter out noise from the real timc data. Th is inc reases the system robusr capability,
7. Transplantable Capability
Considering the transplantable capability for the developed systcrnc standardiza tion and
modularization designs arc used in the development. Thereby . program can be
transplanted from one system to anothe r easily. This increased the I1cxibility of systcm
develo pment .
Considering the possiblc future application in practice. some functions are implemented
in the software, i.c., in the programs. Thisca pabilitydecreased thc numbcr ofh ardware
components in system, and correspondingly reduced the sizcofsystem and the cost for
dcvclopmCl1andim plcmcnl3tion in practicc,
The risk-based SPC system has excellen t cxtcnsibility, not only it can be applied in the
stud icd sys tcrnsc thc tank filling system and the steam power syste m. but also it can be
popularized to other industrial processes . Furthermore, after modification. it can be
extended to bca pplicd in the real time monitori ng and prediction to natural catastrophcs ,
such as tsunami.earthquake, etc. end even in economic analysis .
The ability to identify multiple faults is an important but a difficult requirement
(Vc.-nkat3subramanianet at., 2(03) . In the risked-based SPC fault diagnosis and safety
management system, multiple faults identification has been completcdsueccssfulIy.The
breakthrough from univariate monitoring to multivariate monitoring for SPC fault
diagnosis has been made in this research. and also the correlation problem among the
multiple controlled variables has been solved.
Chap te r 6 Conclusion and Fut ur e Wor k
There arc abundant literatures on process fault diagnosis approaches which range from
analy tical redundancy to knowledge-based systems and neural networks . Broadly, the
existing process fault diagnosis approaches can bcclassificd into three general categories .
They arc quantitative model-based methods, qualitative model-based methods, and
process history based methods . Quantitative model-based method is impractical to be
utilized in real industrial processes because of system complexity. higb dimensionality
and process nonlinearity. Qualitative model-based method will generate spurious
solutions when reasoning with qualit ative models . While the conventional process
history-based method needs large amount of historical process data . For these above
reasons, Vcnkatasubramanian ct al. (2003)e"en propose to deve lop hybrid systems 10
overco me the limitation s of individual approach. In this situation for fault diagnosis in
process engineering and the safety incident s that lead 10 thc scrious consequences for
people, the cnvironmcnl and property, an innovativc mctbodclogyo f risk-based SPC fault
diagnosis and its integration with Safety Instrumented Syslem (SIS) for proccsssystcms
is proposed in this researc h.
The proposed methodology of risk-bascd SPC fault diagnosis and safety manage ment
neither depends on the process models as model-based methods , nor depends on large
amount of historical process data as conventional process history bascdmethod.Earlier
dcvcloJ".-deonlTOlehansareuscdtodistinguishabnonnal situation from normal opcration
based on three -sigma rule and lineartrcnd forecast. To minimize the numbcr offalsc
alarms ,riskindieatorsarcuscdtoidcntifyanddetennincpolentialfauIt(s).
In order to testify the proposed methodology , two process systems arc built in G2
development em-ironment The first process system is a lank filling system in process
industry, and the second process system is 3 steam POWcf plant system located in
Thcnnodynamics and Fluids Lab in Faculty of Engineering and Applied Sciencc building
at ~lcmoria l lJn ivers i ry o f Newfound land
Through the verification of the proposed methodology in the tank filling system in
Chaptcr L we can sce that all the thresholds . including the maximum volumc for thc tank,
wcrcdesignatcd by thcdcsigncr,a ndnomodclisnccdcdin thefau ltdiagnosis and safety
management process. Therefore. the fact that the proposed methodology neithe rdepends
on any model, nor depends en large historical data has been verified . Funher ,through the
comparison between the tank filling system developed with the proposed methodology
and a traditional dcsign forthcsamcsystcm fromthcprcviousdcve1oper Cen Nanwe
can conclude the advantages of the fonnersystcm over the lancrsystcm as shown in
Throu ghlhevcrificat ion oflhcproposcd risk·bascd SPC faulld iagnosis and safety
managcmcntmelhodologyinthe slcarnp owcrp lant systcmin Chap lcr4 , wc can scc lhat
thc proposcd rncthodologynci lhcrd cpcnds ona ny model,no rd ependson largehi slorical
data , because in the steam power plant system, wcju st need to know thc norrnal opcration
values and the extremelimi ts for the component parameters, whilc thcsc normal opcration
valuesa nd lheextremeli mitsarejusl likethc nominalvalucsandspeei ficalion limitsfor
a component. sueh as a capacitor or a breaker in a circuit. Abovc all, in this venflcation. a
breakthrough has been made, that is, the breakthrough from univaria te monitoring to
multivariate monitoring forSPC fault diagnosis . and also thc correlati on problem among
the multiple controlled variables has been solved. Further, through the comparison
bctwccnthcstcampowcrplantsystemdeHlopcdwiththeproposcdmcthodologyandthe
traditional expert systems method for the same system, we can conclude the advantages
of the former system over the latter system as shown in Table 10
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Intrcd uccd inro tbe proces faultdiagnosisinI9313SthcSh~·hancontrolchan.thc
coo\'entionaJ SPC clwtsha\"cbecnutcnsi\·clyuscdinindustrialprocesses_Howc\'Cf.thc
conven tional SPC fault diagnosis method is not written into an)' branch in Fig. 13.
because there are two vital limitations for thc conventional SPC fault diagnosis me:thod
Oncisthatth cco O\-cntional SPCehantauni\'3rialccontrolehart,anditcannothandlc
multivariate processes and the correlation among controlled variables . The other vital
limiu tionfo rth c con\'entiona I SPCmcthodismthcdataacquisition tcchnology .
In this research. the first limitation has been solved . that is. the breakthrough from
univaria tc monitoring to multi\ 'ariatcmonitoringforSPCfauhdiagnosishas becnmade.
anda lso the eorrclation problema mong lhc multipleeo ntcollcd variablcs hasbccnsol\'cd
So. the future works for this research arc as follows'
I. Further develop the multivariate monitoring for the proposed methodology of
risk-based SPC fault diagnosis and its integration with safety instrumented system
2.Tl)' to rcalizc anothcr brcakthrough for lheot hcr limitationof thc SPCfa ult diagnusis
int hcd ata acquisitiont cchnology.
3. Apply the proposed methodol ogy which has broken through the two limitationsinto
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